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I:\ THE SUPREe!E COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF CT."\H, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
~s Case No. 
14586 
\HLLL~·l L. FO~<S :1'TH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEr OF RESPONDENT 
STt\TE'-1E:JT OF THE CASE 
Thr~ 2pr·~llant, \~illiam L. Forsyth, appeals from 
an oc·dcr c1'ce:r:iw.; his Dotioil to 1-:ithdraw his guilty plea and 
ju0JDeJt anl s0rtcncc entered thereon in the Fourth Judicial 
J. Rob·:::r+- i~ll]l':Jr:::-:, prc::..;iding. 
It; 'l'HS LO\VER COURT 
J l '~. ~ ':- r.rJtiun to • ..:i lhc1r<:llv his guilty plea 
I l -~ l '! . > 
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and appellant 1·1as sentenced for an indeterminate term in the 
Utah State Prison, with execution of the sentence stayed 
pending appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the order denying 
appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent substantially agrees with appellant's 
Statement of Facts, but makes the following deletions, 
additions and corrections: 
1. On August 11 and 12, 1975, after the prelimina~ 
hearing, appellant and his original counsel discussed the 
matters involved, the importance of the preparation, and 
counsel's fee requi~ements (Tr.50). Appellant stated that 
h~ had ts cc 0 ~-~e ~ricnds and relatives to arrange for the 
fee and get back to his counsel (Tr.51). Between the arraiq~.-
menton September 12, 1975, and the trial date on Jan~ary 5, 
1976, however, appellant contacted his counsel only once and 
had failed to make the necessary arrangements. Appellant's 
counsel had tried many times but failed to contact appellant 
(Tr. 51-54). 
-2-
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2. During appellant's colloquy with the court 
concerning the voluntariness of his guilty plea, he s~ated 
that he had not been threatened by anyone except the pursuit 
of other charges against him if he did not plead guilty (Tr. 
7 3) • 
3. Appellant made no complaints about his 
attorney up to the time of his guilty plea. 
4. The prosecutor denied that any of his statements 
during the plea bargaining process were not in compliance 
with the A.B.A. Canons of Ethics and claimed that appellant's 
motives in pleading guilty, attempting to withdraw the 
plea, not cooperating with counsel, and not cooperating 
with Adult Probation and Parole were merely to manipulate 
the entire judicial process (Tr.lOO). 
5. The probable cause standard enunciated by 
the court was in reference to the sufficiency of appellant's 
alleged defense during the hearing on the motion to withdraw 
and not in reference to sufficiency of the State's evidence 
(Tr .117) . 
-3-
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ARGllt-!ENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA \~AS MADE VOLU:,TARILY 
AND FREE FROM COERCION BECAUSE ANY STATEMENTS 1-L"'·.DE BY 'T!IE 
PROSECUTION DID NOT OVERCOME THE \viLL OF THE APPsLLA~T TO 
RATIONALLY WEIGH THE CHOICES BEFORE HH!. 
In determining the voluntariness of a guilty 
plea, the United States Supreme Court, in an article 
contained in 25 L.Ed.2d 1025, 1029-30 (1971), enumerated 
a number of factors which can be taken into consideration, 
among them whether the plea was induced by some form of 
coercion, such as threats or intimidation. Appellant 
alleges that his guilty plea was coerced as a result of 
threats by the pr0secu~ion and his own counsel and by his 
counsel's conduct with respect to financial matters. Even 
if such threats were in fact made, it does not necessarily 
follow that the guilty plea was coerced. To be entitled 
to relief, appellant must show (1) that the threats were 
made; (2) that such threats did in fact influence him; 
and (3) that the influence was such that it amounted to 
coercion. Gardner v. State, 537 P.2d 467 (Nev. 1975). 
-4-
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In determining whether or not appellant was in fact coerced, 
the court may consider all of the evidence including the 
record taken at the time the appellant entered his plea of 
guilty. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 
25 L.Ed. 2d 747 (1970). 
The fact that any threats were ever made by the 
prosecution to the appellant was strongly contested by the 
prosecution with the following: 
"There is no time when the 
defendant has been--when I have had 
direct contact with the defendant. 
I have made comments with regard to 
plea bargaining in the matter with 
defendant's counsel in his law office. 
At this time the defendant was not 
present. I made statements to the 
defendant's attorney in the hall 
probably less than a minute, in 
discussing some of the pros and cons 
of him pleading. At no time were any 
of these discussions not in compliance 
with the A.B.A. Canons of Ethics with 
regard to plea bargaining in criminal 
matters. It is my opinion, your Honor, 
that the defendant has attempted to 
manipulate his own counsel in this case, 
he's- attempted to manipulate the Federal 
Court to get involved in the State in 
this case at this time, he's attempted 
to manipulate the Adult Probation and 
Parole, and he's attempted to manipulate 
this court with regard to the entire 
.oc-ocePdinqs." (Tr .100). 
-5-
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The test for determining whether or not tr . .::se 
statements, if any, did sufficiently influence the 
appellant in his decision to plead c;ui l ty, was outli:·E'd 
in Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323, 324 
(1969), where this Court stated: 
"But the mere fQct that a 
defendant, against whom there are 
multiple cha~ges pending, pleads 
guilty to on~ of them on the condi-
tion that the others be dropped 
certainly does not in and of itself 
compel a finding of coercion. There 
is nothing in this regard to justify 
a conclusion that the will of the 
plaintiff (sic "defendant") was 
overcome, or that he did not 
rationally weigh the choices before 
him and choose the one which he then 
thought was most beneficial to his 
interest." 
In accordance wit~ ~he great volume of caselaw in this 
area, Strong 1ndicates that in determining the voluntariness 
of a guilty plea, courts of necessity must focus on the ques: 
of what factor or factors motivated d defendant to plead 
guilty in a particular case. If, for example, the guilty 
plea was the considered choice of the accused, free of 
coercion, promises or any other factor or inducement which 
overcame the will of the accused, and was a free and 
open to him, the plea is said to be voluntary. This is true 
-6-
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regardless of the defendant's guilt of the specific crime 
in question. If, on the other hand, the accused pleaded 
guilty because of some influence not properly to be 
considered as a factor in his decision, then the plea 
is said not to be voluntary. See, e.g., United States 
ex rel. Bro~n v. LuVallee, 301 F.Supp. 1245, 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969). 
The Court in Brady, supra, also emphasized that 
possible innocence of the defendant and certain encourage-
Dents and motivations by the prosecution are not solely 
d~terminativc of the coercion question. It was said there: 
"The State to some degree encourages 
pleas of guilty at every important step 
in the criminal process. For some people 
their breach of a State's law is alone 
sufficient reason for surrendering them-
selves and accepting punishment. For 
others, apprehension and charge, both 
threatening acts by the Government, jar 
them into admitting their guilt. In still 
other cases the post-indictment accumulation of 
evidence m~y con~ince the defendant and his 
counsel that a trial is not worth the agony 
etn:l expense to the defendant and his family. 
All these pleas of guilty are valid in spite 
of the State's responsibility for some of 
th~ fetctors motivating the pleas; the pleas 
arc no more improperly compelled than is the 
decision bv a defendant at the close of the 
Sc;1t•·'s ('\·irlc>nc" at trial that he must take 
:-+-- :._l '-',1:1\-l•...;L -L:.._lllo II 397 
I' 
-7-
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Respondent contends that the detailed transcript 
of the inquiry by the trial court into the volunt1riness 
of the guilty plea clearly established no cocrci:Jl1 suffi-
cient to overcome the free will of the appellant (Tr.69-74). 
Appellant specifically stated that he had not be2n threatene: 
with anythi~g other than the pursuit of charges agreed to be 
dropped in accordance with the plea bargain (Tr.73). In 
addition, contrary to his assertion that he anticipated 
probation, appellant stated he had not been promised 
anything and was told to dismiss any promise from his 
consideration (Tr.70,72,73,97). Moreover, not only is 
appellant's belief as to his innocence not conclusive as 
to involuntariness, as stated above, but appellant stated, 
after conferr~~g ~1th his counsel, that he pleaded guilty 
because he was guilty (Tr.72). Finally, any possible 
adverse financial considerations could validly form the 
basis of a guilty plea under Brady, supra. For these 
reasons, it is clear that appellant was not coerced or 
threatened beyond that of the realities for any defendant 
in any case. He rationally weighed the choices before 
him and in light of the evidence, would have undoubtedly 
plectd ("):;' .: u t ~l ~-':. 
statements or adverse financial circumstances. 
-8-
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POINT II 
Tf:F. 'i'RIAL COU'.<T COERECTLY USED A PROBABLE 
C<.CSI: Sc.>:;J:,RD Ill DETER:iiNING FACTUAL BASIS FOR 
'>!'S GUILTY PLEA BEC.'·USI: A DETERHINATION OF GUILT 
3Ei"OND A ?.t.,'\SOcYA3LE DOUBT OR EVEN BY THE PREPOHDERANCE 
C." THI: E\JIDI:1:CE IS U~HJECESSARY. 
Prioc to a complete summary of evidence by the 
pros~cuti~~ ~ith respect to appellant's guilt, the 
court considered the question of whether appellant had 
a r,,eritorious defense to the prosecution's claims. 
At this ti~e the court stated that it was using a 
probable cause standard rather than beyond a reason-
able doubt (Tr.ll7). The court noted that it was 
not necesEary to establish the defense beyond a 
re~sonabl~ ~oubt since that standard is normally left 
to the jury during a trial. The question as to the 
standard ~2s raised by the prosecution and not the 
~0"cnsc. ~~2th0r the court used a probable cause 
''tc nclo.ru 2.n c1eterr:,i•,ing factual basis of all the evidence 
Al tLou<Jh r11an~' c:1ses are presented with 
t~c issu~ o" ~h~th~r th0re is a sufficient factual 
LFlsis for • ,,,. c;uilt'/ pl0a, most courts fail to 
-9-
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tt~i.3l COl 
b.J.sis of thr· r)!r:J. 
~lc2ded c1uilt~· he ~Q~e nc assertions of innoc~n~~. 
Jt 
was only at the ti~~ of ~ithJrawal of the plea that 
~:p~::llar.t cont·~nded innocencr:. 
t'nt once tl.t' tL-ic.tl couL-~ h:~s satisfied lts ·1,- t:",at 
tb~re is c.t factual ~asis for the guilty plea an~ it 
need not r0itcratc ~ll of the evi~cnce agains~ --~ 
This c.l:o:; 
c:~~h2si~c~ t!12t tht· trial c0urt used a probable =a~se 
to appellant's allege2 
- L I!~ ll'"l7 t 1 
-1 '-
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETElCIHNED THERE 
1:'\S SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A FACTUt\L Ill\SIS 
FOR APPELLACIT' S GUILTY PLEl\. 
It is a well-settl~d rule ~hat the trial 
court is not required to specifically require of 
the defendant as to the factu2l basis for a pl2~ 
of guilty. Inquiring of the county attorney, 
examination of the presentence report, minutes of 
testimony, conversations with both sides during a 
plea negotiation conference, or from any othnr part 
of the record, if before the court, are altc:,:native 
methods. State v. Painter, 195 ~eb. 183, 237 N.W.2d 
142 (1976); PeOiJle v. Emery, 30 Ill.App . .3d 466, 344 
N.E.2d 43 (1976); C:+:::.':<: •.·. Huizar, 112 Adz. J89, 543 
P.2d lllS (l'JI~;; , ,]·,l·..e ·:. Robinson, 28 Ill. .ll.pp. 3d 
757, 329 N.E.2d 317 (1975). 
From the record it is clear that the trial ccu:-t 
satisfied itself the;re 1:u.s a fact•Jal basis for- the 
guilty plea. l;t the ti111e of the plea appc ll.>nt •;r,ccif icall: 
stated that he pleaded CJUilty b2cause he \·:cts ')tcilt'.' 
( tr. 72). In addition, Count I o: thr· Inforrnation \:,<; 
certain regarding th~ ocfcn::;c: to \.llich l11.' 1,?a:~ t(> f'~t u: 
(Tr.69). By the tiwe> of the cleci•;ir·:l on :w:nl! :nc ':; 
-u-
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rrction to withdra~ the plEa the presentence report 
had nJt been filed (7r.lS4). During the hearing on 
appellant's motion to withCraw the plea the court 
listened to fourteen tra~script pages of evidence 
presented by the prosecution as to what evidence it 
intended to introduce into trial (Tr.l26-l39). This 
is in addition to the fact that the appellant had 
appeared before the trial court at least eight times 
upon different motions and circumstances and was thus 
well aware of the factual basis behind the plea. 
Appellant contends that the trial court failed 
to find a sufficient factual basis to support appellant's 
intent to coiT\Ii,i.t the crme, as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-405 (i) (Supp. 1975). The prosecution 
detailed the scheme of appellant and explained several 
times how intent could be shown from the deception 
(Tr. 126-128, 131, 136). As stated under Point II above, 
it ~as unnecessary for the trial court to resolve all 
questions beyond a reasonable doubt. In Interest of 
Higgins, 348 N.E.2d 292, 295 (Ill. App. 1976), where 
defendant's guilty plea to the crime of battery was 
accepted over the possible defense of self-defense, 
: ' ' ~ _l ~-~ ' : 
-13-
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"The require8ent that the 
trial coL~t be satisfied there 
is a fact~al basis for the plea 
before accepting a guilt~ plea 
does not compel the court to 
resolve all contradictory eviden~e 
in the case. The court need not 
be convinced beyond a reascnable 
doubt there is a factual basis 
for each elenent of the offense 
charged." 
For these reasons, respond~nt contends the 
trial court correctly determined there was sufficient 
evidence to form a factual basis for appellant's 
guilty plea. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DETERIHNING THAT THE APPELLANT DID NOT PRESEtiT A 
PLAUSIBLE BASIS FOR WITHDRAWING HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
It is also a well settled standard in the State 
of Utah that the granting or refusing to permit the 
withdrawal of a guilty plea is a matter which lies in 
the sound discretion of the trial judge. Henline v. 
Smith, 548 P.2d 1271 (1976); State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 
124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963); Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 
913 (lOth Cir. 1973); State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 
P.2d 825 (1932). This is in accordance with the lltah 
:Zl. , i ' . - I 
(1953), which states: 
-14-
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"The court may at any time 
before judgment, upon a plea of 
guilty, permit it to be withdrawn 
and a plea of not guilty substituted." 
Under Point I above, it was shown that appellant's 
guilty plea was not coerced because he was able to make a free 
and rational decision between the available alternatives. Any 
stateme~ts by the prosecution or appellant's original counsel 
were not sufficient to overcome the will of the appellant. 
Thus, any alleged coercive statements cannot be considered 
as factors in determining the withdrawal of the guilty plea. 
Appellant alleges three factors which the court 
failed to consider in its decision to deny appellant's motion 
to withdra<.J: no prejudice to the State; this was a pre-sentence 
motion; and appellant's innocence. Respondent admits that 
post-sentence motions to withdraw may be somewhat less 
reliable, but contends that simply because the motion was 
made prior to sentencing does not call for a wholesale abandon-
ment of guilty pleas. In the present case, it should be 
remembered that appellant agreed to plead guilty pursuant to 
a plea barg~ining process, upon the advice of competent counsel, 
voluntarily and understandinqly, during an extended dialogue 
r•'_, • 
-1 ')-
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the promised bargain by the prosecution. The proscc·tion 
kept its part of the bargain by dismissing u series o~ 
counts of the information pursuant to the agrec~ent. In 
Stinson, supra, the court held that where the appPll.ont 
had made a recent and clear statement before the scnt~ncing 
judge that he understood the charge and the naximur1 pcmi sh-
rnent and the judge was advised of the plea bargain, the 
refusal to permit the plea to be withdrawn was not an abuse 
of discretion by the State trial court. 
Other cases have reached similar results. In 
State v. Huntlev, 129 N.J. Super. 13, 322 A.2d 177, 179 
(1974), where appellant desired to withdraw his guilty plea: 
to robbery and sodomy crier to sentencing, the court held: 
"'c,e have canvassed the entire 
rLcLrd and agree with the trial judge 
that the guilty pleas were voluntarily 
and knowingly entered, and that the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
in refusing to permit withdrawal of the 
pleas. . Defendant's vare assertions 
that he mistakenly entered his guilty 
pleas, and that he was improperly coerced 
to do so, are unsupported in the record. 
His late protestations of innocence, and 
the victim's certification of defendant's 
innocence on the sodomy charge were found 
to be unworthy of belief, and were properly 
rejected by the trial judge. Th~ fiqure 
o:= ]u:~~j_(..":-::. 1S u~~~rJ1r·j,,r[ L·~~- -i~ -.-, 1 t,li 
L ,) ~ 'tO.·; ,. '" J,: 
justice. 
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. when a voluntary and knowing 
plea bargain has been entered into 
simultaneously with the guilty plea, 
defendant's burden of presenting a 
plausible basis for his request to 
withdraw his guilty plea is heavier. 
The approved philosophy of 'plea 
bargaining' is dependent upon the good 
faith of both sides in carrying out the 
bargain when it is voluntarily and 
knowingly made, is fair and just and is 
ultimately approved by the trial judge. 
A \·JhiD.sical change of mind by defendant, 
or the prosecutor, will not be a valid 
reason for altering the bargain . 
Even a belated assertion of innocence 
will not upset an otherwise validly 
entered into plea bargain." North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 
160, 27 L.Ed. 2d 162 (1970). (Emphasis 
added . ) 
In State v. Ellison, lll Ariz. 167, 526 P.2d 706, 
707 (1974), the Court said: 
"It is not sufficient to show that 
the defendant merely changed his mind if 
he \·lOS advised by counsel throughout the 
proce~dings, understood the proceedings 
to the best of his ability, and was under 
no coercion or misapprehension concerning 
the consPquences of his guilty plea. 
In foct, a defense attorney may be performing 
his best service for his client in advising 
him to ploaJ guilty as a means of bargaining 
for the most lenient treatment possible." 
Fe• theso roasor.s it is clear that merely because the appellant 
r·•H),. his i• •LJr(•J un>hcst:<ti0!1S of innoc:ence prior to sentencing, 
l \ : -.. · l_~""-' L '-' '"l • 
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court specifically determined appellant's motives of 
manipulating the system and correctly used its discrc"ion 
to deny appellant's motion. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT RECEIVED ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF 
COMPETENT COUNSEL BECAUSE HIS ATTORNEY \\1AS A CO:·lPET.' .T 
MEMBER OF THE BAR WHO SHOWED A WILLINGNESS TO IDENTJFY 
HIMSELF WITH AND REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF APPELLANT IN 
GOOD FAITH. 
The right to effective or adequate assistan2e of 
counsel was first enunciated by the United States Suprenc 
Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72 L.Ed. 158, 53 
S.Ct. 55 (1932), which held that failure to make an 
effective appoi~t~~~c of counsel violates the Sixth 
Amendment right t:J counsel and is a denial of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Later cases have held that adequate assistance of 
counsel depends on whether the advice to plead guilty was 
within the range of competence demanoed of attorneys in 
criminal cases. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 
s.ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed. 2d 763 (1970); 'l'ollett~·_.___II~_I2~~>_Cl_l'1• 
4 ~ l (_j • s • ~ ~ ~ 1 Sl j .. ~,. C t • l ;, (I/ • (", l,. ,<:. 
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Beyond the general tests hinted in Tollett and McMann, 
ho~ever, the Supreme Court has relegated to state and 
lo~er courts the task of defining more specifically 
the standard of adequate representation by counsel. 
In Strong v. Turner, supra, this Court outlined 
the test of competence of court appointed counsel in ~e-
trial proceedings with respect to a guilty plea as follows: 
"No one will question that the 
right of an accused to counsel means 
by a competent member of the Bar who 
shows a willingness to identify 
himself Hith and represent the interests: 
of the defendant in good faith." 
452 P.2d at 324. 
The cou~t held that the mere fact that counsel held 
relatively brief conferences with the accused prior to 
entry of the guilty plea did not establish that the aCJ:Used 
was denied effective representation by counsel. Other 
Utah cases also suggest that the Court look to the 
record for suggestions of "bad faith conduct on the pan:t 
of the ottorne·,·." \'lashing ton v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d 361, 
412 P.2c1 449 (1966). This concept of "bad faith" was 
-19-
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"The [due process] requirement 
[of counsel] is not satisfied by a 
sh~m or oretense of an appearance in 
th~, record by an attorney who 
manifests no real concern about the 
interests of the accused." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Appellant does not contend that his origiuctl 
counsel was incompetent. He maintains, however, tha~ 
counsel's representation with respect to fees and proba-
tion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Respondent contends that the record clearly shows 
appellant had not only adequate but effective assistance 
of competent counsel. 
It should be noted preliminarily that appellant's 
counsel in the present case was pri\·ately retai:1ed rather t': 
court assignee::. ~r.:.s Cm1rt in Stronq, supra, observed that 
counsel was court-appointed and many other cour~s nake a 
similar distinction. See, e.g., Lo~tis v. Es~eele, 515 
F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1975); Da\·is \". Sla\·ton, 353 F.Supp. 
571 (\'a. 1973); ·~:odern Status of Eule as to Tes~ in 
Federal Court of Effective Representation bv Cc~~sel," 
26 A.L.R. Fed. 218, 23S (19"76). 
c~oosin.;:. 
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Other facts support the contention that appellant 
was adequately represented. On January 5, 1976, the court 
entertained defense counsel's motion for continuance. 
Grounds for the continuance were stated by appellant's 
counsel as follows: 
"A preliminary hearing was held 
August llth and 12th I believe, Your 
Honor. At that time I discussed with 
ny client the matters involved, the 
importance of the preparation and my 
fee requirements. My client stated that 
he would attend to these matters. We 
came to--or I came to Provo, defendant 
lives in Orem, he was arraigned and trial 
was set in this matter for January 5, 1976 . 
.:>.nd that was on the 12th day of September, 
1975. Thereafter, Your Honor, my client 
informed me that he had several small 
business matters to attend to, that he 
had to see some of his friends and relatives 
to arrange for the fee, and that he would be 
back in contact with me shortly to make his 
records available to me and to review the 
situation. I did not again hear from my 
client until December 2, 1975. In the 
meantime I had written several letters to 
his residence, which he did not receive 
because he was not there and apparently not 
in contact with them. My client agreed to be 
in on the lOth. He did not come in. He 
called my office on Saturday the 12th or 13th 
and said that he would--spoke to my secretary, 
sait th::tt hce would be in the follm.;ing week. 
HP did not come in. I finally reached him by 
tclc·rhcHcC, and he came to my office on Honday 
"c;llo•.:it·"; Cbric,tn,,c;, that \vould have been 
~ ' ' l _-, : ~ l) ' t ::; i. ; ' ,. -~ .::: -~ 
lu .:,, ( ,, ~ . ,j~' ;l.l..__:,\. L.l-~lC" 
r·>.(·nirq ur tlcr_• follo· .. ,ing dL!y." (Tr. 50-51) 
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"The [due process] requirement 
[of counsel] is not satisfied by a 
sham or oretense of an appearance in 
th2 record by an attorney who 
manifests no real co~cern about the 
interests of the accused." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Appellant does not contend that his originctl 
counsel was incompetent. He maintains, however, that 
counsel's representation with respect to fees and proba-
tion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Respondent contends that the record clearly shows 
appellant had not only adequate but effective assistance 
of competent counsel. 
It should be noted preliminarily that appellant's 
counsel in the present case was privately retained rather t~ 
court assigned. This Court in Strong, supra, observed that 
counsel was court-appointed and many other courts make a 
similar distinction. See, e.g., Loftis v. Esteele, 515 
F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Slayton, 353 F.Supp. 
571 (Va. 1973); "Modern Status of Rule as to Test in 
Federal Court of Effective Representation by Counsel," 
26 A.L.R. Fed. 218, 238 (1976). Although such a distinction 
is not determinative of appellant's claims, it is important 
choosing. 
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Other facts support the contention that appellant 
was adequately represented. On January 5, 1976, the court 
entertained defense counsel's motion for continuance. 
Grounds for the continuance were stated by appellant's 
counsel as follows: 
"A preliminary hearing was held 
August llth and 12th I believe, Your 
Hone~. At that time I discussed with 
Dy client the matters involved, the 
importance of the preparation and my 
fee requirements. My client stated that 
he would attend to these matters. We 
came to--or I came to Provo, defendant 
lives in Orem, he was arraigned and trial 
was set in this matter for January 5, 1976. 
,\nd that \·.'CIS on the 12th day of September, 
1975. Thereafter, Your Honor, my client 
informed n'2 that he had several small 
business matters to attend to, that he 
had to see some of his friends and relatives 
to arrange for the fee, and that he would be 
back in contact with me shortly to make his 
record~ available to me and to review the 
situation. I did not again hear from my 
client until December 2, 1975. In the 
~eantime I had written several letters to 
his residence, which he did not receive 
bccau3c he was not there and apparently not 
in contact with them. My client agreed to be 
in on the lOth. He did not come in. He 
called my office on Saturday the 12th or 13th 
and suid thut he would--spoke to my secretary, 
s:1it th:1t h,, \vOuld be in the follm·;ing week. 
lk dic1 not come in. I finally reached him by 
tclcpho•,c, etncl he ca01e to my office on Honday 
~r1l 1 o'./it·,, C1lri.st·--·Ll~, th.:tt \v·ould have been 
,"""~ : ~ ; ) ·_: -3 i. ; 1 -' .:i -~ 
lu ",,' ._, ~ · ~ 1 -~ .._; .( ::_; cl ;:-_ 
(Tr.50-51) 
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Appellant's counsel also showed his willingness 
to represent appellant after the hearing when he entered 
into plea negotiations at the request of the prosecutjun 
(Tr.20-2l). Moreover, appellant's counsel continued to be 
interested and participate in the case even when appel~~nt 
hired another attorney. At no time prior to or during the 
entry of the guilty plea did appellant express his dis-
satisfaction with his counsel. And, as stated in ~. 
supra, financial circumstances can justifiably form the 
basis of a guilty plea. For these reasons, respon~~nt 
contends that appellant was adequately represented by 
counsel and any fears he acquired were unjustified and 
unreasonable i~ light of his attorney's good faith effort 
to advise h~~ of the most beneficial course of conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Because appellant was not coerced into entering 
his guilty plea, his plea was supported by adequate factual 
basis according to the correct standard of the trial c•Jc~rt, 
his motion to withdraw the plea was discretionary with the 
trial court and he •:1as effectively r<:'presentcd by cou'1sel, 
respondent respectfully rf'qucsts Lhat this C'Olll·t .1i·,c•ltc;s 
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appellant's appeal and affirm the judgment and sentence 
of the trial co~r~ rendered below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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